

INCOMING AIRGRAM

Department of State

EXCISE

SECRET

Classification

762.00/10-861

Date Sent: OCTOBER 8, 1961

No.:

FROM: AmEmbassy BONN

TO: SecState WASHINGTON

NO.

INFO

US Mission BERLIN
 AmEmbassy LONDON
 AmEmbassy PARIS
 AmEmbassy MOSCOW

A-134
 A-128
 A-130
 A-55

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO AND STORSEL.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

X(4X)1,3(2X3)

There follows a Memorandum of Conversation, covering the talk between Senator Humphrey and Chancellor Adenauer, which took place at the latter's office in Bonn on October 6. The Chancellor received the Senator alone, at Adenauer's request. This Memorandum of Conversation was subsequently dictated by Senator Humphrey (and the text has been forwarded separately to the Senator by the Embassy).

Adenauer will find a number of Adenauer's views of interest, in connection with the general Berlin problem, possible negotiations, German measures to strengthen NATO, and the like.

Adenauer indicated the importance of a meeting with the President and the Secretary of State as soon as possible after the new Bonn Government is established. The new Government will be a coalition of the CDU and FDP with Adenauer as Chancellor, von Drenth as Foreign Minister and Strauss as Defense Minister, and no change in foreign or defense policy. The draft is to be extended for 18 months--to fulfill all manpower commitments to NATO promptly.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

| | | |
|-----------------|----------------|--------------------------------|
| REVIEW | SECRET | REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS |
| APPROVED BY | DATE OF REVIEW | REVIEWED BY |
| NAME OF OFFICER | 14 OCT | TO: R/R |
| NAME OF OFFICER | | |

2

A-427

Washington

SECRET

I explained to
him my position in this matter, namely that while the Oder-Neisse Line was surely a

SECRET

SECRET

subject for discussion or negotiation. It had to be included in a much broader proposal. It was not an item to be dealt with separately but one to be used as a bargaining point on a subject which might be more vital to Germany and to the West.

I urged upon Adenauer that the decisions on Berlin, including access, the possibility of a Soviet treaty with the GDR, and other matters, were not only our responsibility—they were the mutual responsibility of all of us. I told Adenauer that I had a feeling President Kennedy would like to know from the Federal Republic its frank and honest views on all matters so that whatever negotiations we enter into with the Soviets, such would be conditioned by the knowledge of Adenauer's position. I said we did not want to have some German leader ten years from now accusing the United States of having betrayed Germany. In other words, Germany must take its fair share of these responsibilities and saw the point. I pressed this point with Dr. Erhard today.

I made it manifestly clear to Erhard, as to Adenauer, that it was not just our decision and our responsibility, and that the Federal Republic and its officials would have to share in the decision-making and the preparation of such decisions.

being

I reminded Adenauer of some of the problems faced by President Kennedy from the Radical Right, the supreme super-nationalists back in the States. I urged that the Federal Republic officials, and indeed its press, be very conscious of this political problem in every statement, action and utterance. It would not be to the interests of the United States or Germany to have the Kennedy Administration and its friends feel that any action on the part of Germany was feeding the appetites and the propaganda grist mills of the John Birch Society and the other elements of the Radical Right. I pointed out that President Kennedy needed some room for maneuver and negotiation, and that it was the duty of the Federal Republic to make the word "negotiation" a decent, honored word and not make it appear the synonym for appeasement or weakness. In effect, I respectfully suggested that President Kennedy not only could be trusted but ought to be. He is the leader of the most powerful nation in the world and he needs the unqualified support, trust and confidence of the leaders of our Allies, and particularly of Adenauer. The Chancellor reacted very favorably to this. I suggested to the Chancellor that because of his many years of experience in dealing with dictators and fighting against dictatorship, at home and abroad, his wise counsel would always be welcome and also needed.

MORRIS

EHM:sm
October 7, 1961 3127

EHM:sm

SECRET

56

BEST AVAILABLE COPY